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Litigation and Corporate Governance:
An Essay on Steering Between

Scylla and Charybdis

John C. Coffee, Jr.*

Criticism of the ALI's Corporate Governance Project has had two
very different strains. Most vocal have been those critics who exhibit what one sympathetic observer has aptly termed "a neurotic
fear of articulation."' Although their expressed concern namely, that courts will be encouraged to second guess boards and
impose liability for arm's length business decisions that turned
Copyright © by John C. Coffee, Jr.
* B.A. 1944, Amherst College; L.L.B. 1969, Yale University; L.L.M. 1976, New
York University. Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author is
serving as Associate Reporter for Part VII (Remedies) of the ALI's Corporate Governance Project. The views expressed herein are strictly those of the author and do
not purport in any respect to represent those of the American Law Institute, its Council, or the other Reporters.
1. Professor Victor Brudney of Harvard used this phrase at a Conference on
Shareholder Litigation sponsored by Duke University Law School on March 16, 1984.
For a fuller statement of Professor Brudney's views, see Brudney, The Role of the
Board of Directors: The ALr and Its Citics, 37 U. MIAM L. REV. 223 (1983). In his
final speech to the American Law Institute as its Executive Director at its annual
meeting in May, 1984, Herbert Wechsler characterized many of these same critics as
"men who will not throw chaos lightly to the wind." See ALI, Remarks and
Addresses at the 61st Annual Meeting, May 15-18, at 54 (quoting Judge Roger Traynor). My own view is somewhat different: there has been a significant difference in
the reaction to the ALI's effort between those accustomed to looking at legal issues ex
ante as nonadversarial planners and those whose perspective is invariably ex post (i.e.,
the litigators). The first group, consisting primarily of the "true" corporate lawyers,
has little doubt about the desirability of clarification or the need for predictability
(although they may dispute specific principles), whereas the second group tends to
prefer an open-textured body of law that maximizes ability to manipulate precedents
in order to defend clients in future cases.
May-August 1984 Vol. 52 Nos. 4.5

sour - would be a legitimate cause for anxiety if this indeed were
the intent or likely effect of the Project, the underlying fear of
these critics is more basic and instinctive. It is best revealed in the
title of one critique of the Project by a Harvard Business professor: Corporate Governance Eludes the Legal Mind.2 Essentially,
its author argues that corporate governance is an organic and
evolving form that prescriptive legal rules can only freeze or distort. Such a claim goes beyond viewing lawyers as literalistic pettifoggers and seems actually to assert that the ineluctable should
remain ineluctable. In a world where murkiness is seen as a virtue and clarity a vice, we are advised to let sleeping doctrines lie.
Why is there this fear of a relatively straight-forward attempt to
define the issues and pose basic policy choices? At bottom, this
anxiety arises because any effort to replace chaos with clarity
highlights issues that some would prefer be glossed over: for example, are shareholders the owners of the firm? Or is management entitled to balance shareholder interests against those of
other constituencies, including creditors, employees, and consumers? To ask these questions is not to answer them, but if one prefers the latter balancing-of-constituencies model of management's
responsibilities, one must address the difficult issue of who, if anyone, can hold management accountable. Otherwise, the claim that
management should be responsive to all constituencies may mean
in reality that it is accountable to none.
This assertion that "corporate governance eludes the legal
mind" translates then into a claim that some topics are best left
undisturbed - much like sacred mysteries that should only be discussed by the tribal elders in private councils. It is one thing to
pursue a fuller and more empirically-grounded description of how
boards and managements interact today but quite another to pretend that such description eliminates the need for prescription.
The attempt to state clear legal principles is nothing more or less
than the attempt to articulate a normative theory and, at least
since David Hume, it has been generally recognized that empiricism alone cannot produce a normative theory.
If the posture of this first group of critics thus resembles that of
the schoolboy nervously whistling as he passes the graveyard, another group of critics has not been afraid to face the normative
issues in a candid and provocative manner and to offer substantively different models for the interaction between boards, management, and shareholders. In particular, both Professor Cox of
2. Andrews, CorporateGovernanceEludes the Legal Mind, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.
213 (1983). Professor Andrews argues that the significant issues in corporate governance "are beyond the reach of the law" and instead involve only questions of "professional competence and responsibility" that "cannot be prescribed by black letter law."
Id. at 215. Under this view, the law of torts would have long since withered away in
the face of claims by various professions that their standards could not be understood
by the "legal mind." That directors may sometimes be "creative participants" in management (as Professor Andrews properly argues) and not merely ex post monitors (as
Professor Scott favors, see infra note 3) does not excuse the need for a serious normative theory.
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Duke and Professor Scott of Stanford have been prepared to state
clear premises and to propose a different role for a litigation remedy than that contemplated by the ALI's Reporters. 3 Both are
also men of incisive intelligence and considerable persuasiveness.
Yet, although both make sophisticated use of the new learning
on institutional economics, they have not spoken with a single
voice. To the contrary, they have straddled the position of this
Reporter, taking positions approximately equidistantly removed
from mine but on diametrically opposite sides. Professor Scott
would essentially abandon the duty of care, discarding it as a superfluous doctrine that was mistakenly borrowed from the law of
trusts and misapplied to the corporate context. Apparently in his
view, boards exist to grade management from an exclusively ex
post perspective and should seldom, if ever, intervene prospectively in business decisions. Professor Scott would, however, enforce the duty of loyalty zealously against controlling persons and
would never permit termination of a derivative action based on
the board's recommendation when the action was against a controlling person and was grounded on the duty of loyalty. Convinced of the need for deterrence, he is even prepared to consider
eliminating the requirement for an injured plaintiff and appears
ready to permit a lawyer to file an action in his own right as a
private enforcer. In contrast, Professor Cox states the case for a
more compensatory orientation for litigation remedies. In his
view, economics suggest that the duty of care should be as vigorously enforced as the duty of loyalty; and thus he objects to our
proposal for placing a ceiling on due-care liability. Thus, as the
target caught in the cross fire, I find it necessary to conduct a twosided defense.
In overview, I will argue that Professor Scott has magnified the
distance between his position and ours, and ignored the fact
(which both Professors Cox and Brudney have pointed out) that
Tentative DraftNo. 1 adopted premises close to his own on some
of the issues that most concern him, and well before he articulated
his position.4 The current draft of Principles of Corporate
3. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence,and the Market as Boundariesof Derivative Suit Proceedings,52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market]; Cox, Searchingfor the Corporation'sVoice in
DerivativeSuit Litigation:A Critiqueof Zapata and the ALI Project,1982 DUKE L.J.
959 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Searching for the Corporation's Voice]; Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute CorporateGovernanceProject, 35 STAN. L.

REv. 927 (1983). Other critics, including those whose articles are included in this issue, should also be exempted from any charge of obfuscation.
4. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRucTuRE: RESTATEMENT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Tentative

Draft No. 1]. In particular, the proposal for a ceiling on liability for negligence in
section 7.06 of Tentative DraftNo. 1 was intended to reduce the incentive for litigation
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Governance:Analysis and Recommendations (Council Draft No.
5) is even more explicit in its view that litigation has only a limited
and problematic ability to enforce the duty of care.5 Where I differ with Professor Scott is chiefly with respect to his overly parsimonious view of the law's socializing capacity and his too facile
treatment of the difficult procedural problems surrounding any
reform proposal in this area. Implicit in his criticism of the duty
of due care is the assumption that the law simply imposes sanctions and does no more. This reductionist approach ignores the
important educational and aspirational role that the law (and lawyers) have long played in our society in setting standards. More
generally, Professor Scott's proposals are confounded by their procedural unfeasibility. As Professor Cox correctly points out, Professor Scott's proposal that the court should, at the outset,
distinguish duty-of-loyalty from duty-of-care allegations (and dismiss the latter immediately) creates an incentive for creative
pleading in order to outflank this prohibition on due-care litigation.6 Although the distinction may not be as unworkable as Professor Cox seems to believe, it is often fuzzy and is not susceptible
to a simple either/or test. In this and other respects, Professor
Scott, as a litigator, makes a fine economist. A far more practical
response is to adjust the incentive to litigate due-care cases by lowering the level of damages obtainable (and thus, by extension, the
attorneys' fees to be awarded successful plaintiffs). The ex ante
effect of such a diminished incentive on the profit-motivated
plaintiff's attorney achieves the same objective by a subtler route
and without sacrificing the aspirational role of the law of due care.
Equally important, because such a ceiling need not apply to all
forms of due-care violations (for example, it would not apply to
knowing illegality or consciously reckless behavior), it provides a
subtler, more discriminating regulatory instrument that does not
overbroadly lump together very different forms of behavior for
equivalent treatment (as does Professor Scott's proposal simply to
abolish the duty).
With respect to Professor Cox, even less distance separates us as
to the critical issues concerning the survival of a litigation remedy
over due-care issues. This intent was clearly expressed at the time of the 1982 ALI
Annual Meeting. See Discussion of Principlesof Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 1, 59 A.L.I. PRoC. 406,
530-36 (1982) (discussing impact of ceiling on incentive to litigate). Professor Scott
also ignores those academic and other writers who well before him criticized the imposition of substantial financial liability on directors to enforce the duty of care. See
Conard, A BehavioralAnalysis of Directors'Liabilityfor Negligence, 1972 DUKE L.J.
895, 914. See also Comments of William F. Kennedy, 59 A.L.I. PRoc. at 545-47.
5. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION (Council Draft No. 5, Nov. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Council Draft No. 5].
Although it has been discussed at meetings of the Council of the American Law

Institute, this draft has not yet been considered in full, or approved in any part, by the
Council. Professor Cox's article in this issue focuses on Council Draft No. 3, which
was dated November 15, 1983, and which has been superseded by Council DraftNo. 5.
See also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Council Draft No. 3, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Council Draft No. 3].
6. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market, supra note 3, at 762-63.

792

VOL. 52:789

Between Scylla and Gharybdis
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

as a monitoring device and the need for judicial review of the termination decision. Although not much emphasized in his contribution here, his views on the problem of structural bias are
probably even stronger than those of this Reporter, 7 and we agree
fully as to the unsuitability of the "demand required, demand excused" procedural distinction as a screening device by which to
sort out those derivative actions that should be terminated. Still,
Professor Cox clearly believes that the ALI's Reporters have
come not to praise the duty of due care but to bury it. Curiously
and perhaps inconsistently, he also argues that we give excessive
attention to one aspect of the duty of due care, the obligation to
comply with applicable law, that others have described as its most
critical component.9 Here, he particularly objects to our position
that the board's power to terminate a derivative action is subject
7. This statement is largely based on Professor Cox's ongoing research with Professor Munsinger, a social psychologist, on the problem of structural bias. See Cox &
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom"Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of CorporateCohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. -

(1985). So critical is Pro-

fessor Cox of the performance of special litigation committees that he faults the ALI's
proposals for not equally allowing a defendant to make the same motion to terminate
as the board's committee may make. Yet, this equation of the defendants with the
special committee glosses over the doctrinal point that the defendant has no claim to
represent the best interests of the corporation in the litigation. Frequently, the justification for dismissal that the court must evaluate at this pre-trial stage will be a
claim that the litigation, even if it is legally meritorious, will still injure the corporation (because of reputational injury, diverted time, revelation of business practices,
etc.). There is no arguable way that the defendant can plausibly advance the claim
that a meritorious action should be dismissed because it will result in harm to the
corporation that outweighs the probable recovery. If the defendant could do so in the
context of derivative actions, he could equally well do so (that is, with equal absurdity) in a direct action by the corporation against him.
Perhaps more importantly, although I agree with Professor Cox as to the likelihood
of structural bias, my review of special litigation committee reports does not lead me
to believe that they are dishonest documents on which no reliance is warranted at all.
Rather, they tend to be factually accurate and often comprehensive reports that predictably reach a preordained conclusion in favor of termination because of the manner
in which they balance the factors specified in the report. Sometimes, there may even
be therapeutic value in the preparation of such reports, as they may set in motion
some internal reforms. In contrast, a report prepared by the defendant is entitled to
no reliance and will probably be a wholly self-serving document. Professor Cox suggests that if the ALI's Reporters seriously wanted a screening mechanism by which to
winnow the nonmeritorious suit they would allow the defendant also to make the
motion to terminate the litigation. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence,and the Market supra note 3, at 786-88. This strikes me as a very misguided proposal.
8. See Cox, Searchingfor the Corporation'sVoice, supra note 3, at 985-86, 100811.
9. See Brudney, The Independent Director- Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARv. L. REV. 597, 656-58 (1982); See also Engel, An Approach to Corporate
Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979) (criticizing those advocating more corporate social responsibility without balancing the costs incurred by corporations). In
his most recent visit to this topic, Professor Brudney writes: "[Tihe most significant
role that they [independent directors] can play is in the matter of encouraging corporate compliance with law." Brudney, supra note 1, at 239.
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to a "frustration of public policy" exception. 10 Although I believe
he overreads this exception, which is more modest in scope than
he suggests, it is clear that Professor Cox is not a champion of all
aspects of the duty of due care but only those that produce a compensatory benefit to shareholders. Our disagreement on this point
has deeper implications: are directors simply agents of the shareholders with no other responsibility? Or is the state not also a
party to the corporate charter and may the state, in return for
granting limited liability, not unreasonably expect that directors

will manage the corporation within the boundaries set by law?'1
This polarized reaction, with Professor Scott viewing us as
overly concerned about managerial negligence and Professor Cox
as overly skeptical, illustrates how vulnerable is the position of
those who occupy the middle of the road. Nonetheless, the middle
of the road bends with the road, and I believe the contemporary
consensus is turning away from Professor Cox's emphasis on liability for negligence. With respect, he stands like Uncas in The
Last of the Mohicans, as the last surviving member of a once proud

tribe of law professors who confidently believed that the natural
goal of reform was to increase the exposure of corporate officials
to liability for negligence.' 2 Moreover, there seems to be an unrec10. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence,and the Marke supra note 3, at 780-83.
11. A long-standing debate has divided, on the one hand, those who see the corporation as purely a private contractual relationship in which the state has no role
(other than to prescribe a model form in its incorporation statute, which the parties
are largely free to vary) and, on the other hand, those who see the corporate form as
involving a concession from the state to the extent that shareholders enjoy limited
liability, which would not have been available at common law to mere partners. This
debate between the contract and concession schools is beyond the scope of this piece,
although I do find Professor Cox to be curiously taking the same position in favor of
the contract view as do Professors Easterbrook and Fischel (with whom he otherwise
seems to disagree). See Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole ofa Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.L. REV.1161, 1191 (1981).
In suggesting that the state is entitled to expect that directors will monitor for law
compliance, the ALI's Reporters have declined the view offered by Professor Fischel
that criminal and civil fines and penalties are simply a price that the legislature puts
on the behavior in question, with the result that payment of this price entitles the
corporation to engage in the misbehavior. See Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movemen 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259,1290 (1982). Such a view, at least as applied to most
regulatory laws, simply mistates the legislative intent, which was not to establish a
tariff but to prohibit certain behavior. In response to the predictable reply that it is
the legislature's own fault that it has set the penalty level too low, I would answer
that this assumes a superficially anthropomorphic view of the legislature, which is not
itself able to monitor violations, act quickly to revise the law, or know the probable
gains to the firm from the type of misbehavior in question. Precisely because the
legislature cannot know how high to set penalty levels in order to make the expected
penalty cost exceed the expected benefit, and because the impact of inflation will ravage any penalty structure over time, the state must rely on enforcement devices other
than directly imposed fines. One of these techniques is to define the fiduciary obligations of managers and directors to include obedience to law. This does not mean,
however, that directors owe enforceable fiduciary duties to other classes, such as employees, consumers, or communities, as Professor Dodd believed. See Dodd, For
Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV.L. REv. 1145 (1932). Rather, the
view I take is simply that corporate fiduciaries are not granted the power by the corporate charter to make a knowing cost-benefit decision to disobey the law.
12. Professor Cox's final paragraph in his contribution to this Symposium fills me
with nostalgia when he describes due-care cases to be "as susceptible to derivative-suit
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onciled tension in Professor Cox's position. His article opens with
an elegant description of the role of the derivative action in reducing systematic risk.1 3 This is advanced as a justification for a deterrent rationale, and indeed it is a very useful contribution to the
literature in this area. Yet, when he turns from theory to prescription, Professor Cox favors a compensatory rationale without
explaining what the relationship between these two justifications
should be.1 4 Here, I fear he has abandoned his own theory and
understated the problems inherent in any attempt to use compensation as an organizing principle.
I will respond in three parts. Part I focuses specifically on the
role of litigation in enforcing the duty of due care. Part II turns to
the more general topic of the appropriate rationale for litigation
- deterrence or compensation. Finally, Part III moves from the
abstract to the specific and defends some specific proposals made
in Council DraftNo. 5 based upon the policy premises outlined in
the preceding sections.
I.

The Continuing but ProblematicRelevance of Due
Care: Some Reflections on the Academic
Tendency Toward Overstatement

Professor Scott, in effect, begins where Professor Bishop left off
almost twenty years ago. In a well known article, Professor
Bishop argued that courts honored the duty of care more in the
breach than the observance.' 5 After surveying the case law, he
found no decision in which courts had actually imposed liability on
facts uncomplicated by an element of self-dealing and only a handful in which the case even survived a pre-trial motion to dismiss.
From Professor Scott's vantage point, this apparent fact that the
duty of due care has lived only in dicta makes it a judicial fiction
and fortunately so, in his judgment. Had it ever been truly enprocedures as are loyalty cases." Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Marke
supra note 3, at 788. This is the old liberalism of William Douglas, as expressed in
Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direc 47 HARv. L. REV. 1305 (1934). Modern liberalism is, however, better defined by Professor Brudney's very different view about the
role of directors. See Brudney, supra note 9 (concluding that the trend to dilute or
eliminate regulatory controls because of the use of independent directors is unrealistic and the task of fostering corporate social responsibility should be left to independent directors).
13. See Cox, Compensation,Deterrence, and the Marke supra note 3, at 746-55.
14. Id. at 777.
15. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of CorporateDirectorsand Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078,1099 (1968). But see Meyers v.
Moody, 693 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming conviction of director-majority stockholder for violation of fiduciary duty in the management of insurance company), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 287 (1983).
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forced, he implies, it would have only made directors risk averse
16
and excessively concerned with the creation of "paper trails."
To assess Professor Scott's claims and Professor Cox's response,
it is important to recognize that Professor Bishop's thesis, which
they both accept as their factual predicate, involves a measure of
overstatement. To begin with, it ignores the central facts that
cases are most often resolved by settlement, not judicial decision,
and that defendants have a particularly strong incentive to settle
derivative actions because, unlike a settlement, an adjudication adverse to them will typically deprive them of eligibility for indemnification.17 As a result, it is likely that cases favorable to the
plaintiff tend to be settled, whereas those in which the defendant
has the relative advantage tend to be dismissed at a pretrial stage,
often in recorded decisions. In this settlement process, the parties
necessarily bargain in the shadow of the law and, thus, judicial
dicta about the scope of the duty has some real world effect.
Rather than being a nullity insofar as its affect on financial liability is concerned, the duty of care has led a twilight existence, marginally affecting the size of settlements (a few of which have been
significant). Indeed, even if the risk of due-care liability were no
greater than that of being struck by a lightning bolt, one must observe that prudent men do not wander out needlessly in a thunderstorm; some are in fact terrified by lightning.
This marginal impact, however, is overshadowed by a more important consequence of the judicial dicta that has elaborated on
the nature of the duty: its educational and socializing effect. Professor Scott seems to believe that the relevant audience - managers and directors - ignores legal commands that do not result in
the imposition of sanctions.1 8 This view is not only too cynical but
also too unsophisticated about the process by which legal rules are
communicated. Here I mean more than the obvious point that the
bench makes a "bully pulpit." Rather, on a more abstract level
the bias of lawyers is to magnify the gravity of relatively remote
16. Scott, supra note 3, at 932-37.
17. Most state indemnification statutes preclude indemnification of litigation expenses incurred in a derivative action "in respect of any proceeding in which the person shall have been adjudged liable to the corporation." See MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT § 5(b) (1980). See also CAL.CORP.CODE § 317(c)(1) (Deering 1984);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney

1984). As a result, settlement ensures that these expenses can be indemnified because
the individual has not been "adjudged" liable.
18. See, eg., Scott, supra note 3, at 935. Professor Scott talks only about the
"threat of negligence liability." Another view of the law's impact is suggested by
Justice Holmes's famous "bad man/good man" distinction. The bad man, said
Holmes, looks at the law caring only for its "material consequences," whereas the
good man "finds his reasons for conduct ... in the vaguer sanctions of conscience."
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 171 (1920). Moreover, at no point does Professor Scott discuss the informational content of the duty.
As he realizes, different monitoring models are possible; the board could monitor ex
ante or only ex post (as he seems to prefer). Although I see little need to draw a
categorical distinction here, the formulation of the duty influences the nature of the
monitoring that is to be required. Thus, the logic of Professor Scott's argument points
not toward abolition of the duty (as he proposes) but toward reformulation of it into a
duty to monitor ex post. This would restrict liability for negligence but not eliminate
it.
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legal risks. Indeed, lawyers maximize their income by identifying
a problem (or a perceived problem that may in fact be considerably less than urgent) and then communicating this problem to potential clients along with their announced ability to solve it.
Because legal risks are a lawyer's stock in trade, lawyers tend to
exaggerate their importance, just as environmentalists tend to
warn of impending ecological disasters that never quite transpire
or as defense officials overreact to perceived foreign military
build-ups. Thus, during the last two decades, legions of corporate
lawyers have stressed to innumerable boards the need for an adequate investigation and a minimally sufficient record as the procedural prerequisite to the substantive protection of the business
judgment rule. Of course, I basically view this as a salutary development, whereas Professor Scott does not. But, whatever one's
evaluation, it is myopic to evaluate the law's impact without taking into account the nonadversarial processes by which lawyers
advise clients and thereby shape the behavior and consciousness of
their clients. Indeed, this legal advice was far from deceptive; not
only was it in accord with the prevalent case law to the effect that
due care must be exercised before the protection of the business
judgment rule applies, 19 but it also was consistent with even more
important developments in federal securities law that essentially
began with the BarChris decision. 20 The conventional wisdom
among lawyers who practiced securities law prior to BarChriswas
that the decision caused a revolution in board behavior by making
directorial negligence a very real basis for the imposition of liability. In light of this significant federal exposure, it is an open question as to who is more the nitpicking purist: the practitioner who
focuses on statements in dicta when advising clients, or the academic who, seeing no state decisions clearly imposing liability,
pronounces the duty an illusion, thereby ignoring the appearance
of a functionally similar duty under federal law. In this light, Professor Scott's proposed abolition of the duty would have only a
marginal effect as long as directors still faced significant federal
19. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (successful
derivative suit for breach of duty of due care); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643
(Sup. Ct. 1944) (derivative action unsuccessful where directors committed honest mistakes); H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 63a, at 161 (rev. ed. 1946)
(business judgment rule presupposes the exercise of diligence and due care); Arsht,
The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 93, 111 (1979) (business
judgment defense based on exercise of due care is valid but limited).
20. Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). This
decision received an extraordinary (and deserved) amount of commentary. See Folk,
Civil Liabilitiesunder the FederalSecurities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV.
1, 4 (1969); The BarChris Case (Symposium), 24 Bus. LAW. 523 (1969).
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liability unless they could establish their "due diligence" defense
under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.21
This assessment, that Professors Bishop and Scott have overstated the argument against duty of care liability, does not address, however, the critical question: is due-care liability desirable
or counter-productive? Here, my response differs from that of
Professor Cox. In my view, what is most desirable about the duty
of care is its socializing and exhortative impact. Since ancient
times, we have worried about "who will guard the guardian?" In
the corporate context, this question becomes "who will monitor
the monitor?" But all monitors, whether in public or private life,
are principally restrained by their own normative standards, including their conception of what persons in their position ought to
do under given circumstances. At least within our society (which,
to be sure, some view as law-obsessed), the legal profession has
generally enjoyed a hegemony over this educational function of
communicating standards to the relevant audience. Nor is this
soon likely to change because few are willing to rely on industrydrafted standards. Leaving the task of standard setting solely to
business groups risks the danger that any resulting code would become an exercise in self-insurance, as potential defendants seek to
eliminate any possibility of liability or litigation.22 In this light,
Professor Scott's proposal to abolish the duty of care carries with
it an unintended normative message to directors: directors are but
a vestigial appendix to the corporation who need not closely concern themselves with impending corporate decisions and probably
should not interfere (except possibly on an ex post basis).
To this point, I expect that Professor Cox would have no serious
objection to my analysis. But a tension arises here between the
aspirational role of due-care standards and the role he emphasizes,
that of liability determination.23 Put simply, liability-oriented
standards are minimum standards; they can neither be aspirational nor evolutionary. Their role is simply to compensate victims and allocate losses. This, I will suggest later, is the role that
the duty of care performs least well. Moreover, the impact of minimum standards may well be to communicate an unintended
message that compliance with the minimum is all that should be
expected.
Perhaps unintentionally, Professor Cox seems to concede that
liability and high standards are incompatible. In response to the
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
22. I certainly agree that business groups should have a substantial role in this
process (as they have been invited to have in the ALI's process). Nor do I contend
that standards drafted by legal groups will be immune from the temptation to emphasize protection of one's clients over other purposes. For a critical commentary on the
recent recodification of the Model Business CorporationAct that sees this influence as
having predominated, see Branson, Countertrendsin CorporationLaw: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law Reform, and Principles of

CorporateGovernance and Structure,68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 58-62 (1983). Nonetheless,
there is a relative difference, and industry drafted standards would exacerbate the
danger of self-insurance.
23. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence,and the Market supra note 3, at 788.
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obvious arguments about the unfairness of imposing substantial
liability on directors for seemingly minor procedural errors or
omissions, he replies that the duty of due care has never demanded very much of directors. This is probably true, but it begs
the question of what the substantive content of the duty should be:
a minimal compliance with procedural standards or a more active
monitoring responsibility. From my perspective, the challenge is
to have an aspirational body of law - at least in the sense that the
duty comprehends more than simply the residue of cases decided
during the administration of William McKinley - and yet not expose corporate officials to a threat of liability that may either chill
the movement toward independent directors or produce excessive
risk aversion. I will later argue that a ceiling on liability for directorial negligence is responsive to these needs, both because it
should reduce the level of risk aversion and because it will not
tempt courts to distort the substantive content of the law in order
to protect sympathetic defendants. Moreover, because the ceiling
need not apply to all forms of due-care violations, it is possible to
have a two-tiered structure to the duty: some categories of violations (knowing violations of law or reckless behavior where the
defendant subjectively perceived the danger to the corporation)
would not qualify for the ceiling and thus would be subject to a
more severe deterrent threat.24 Potentially, such a porous ceiling
achieves the best of both worlds by permitting minimal standards
to co-exist with more aspirational ones.
Before turning to my prescription, however, Professor Cox's
proposal for an invigorated duty of care that would stand on an
equal footing with the duty of loyalty deserves a closer examination in its own right. In making his argument, Professor Cox
scores some easy and sensible points off of Professor Scott, but the
aggregate significance of his objections is open to doubt. Marketbased remedies, he correctly points out, are not a panacea, both
because high tender offer premiums shelter a significant margin
of managerial ineptitude and because smaller companies are not
traded in markets that are generally believed to be efficient.2 He
also makes a useful point that "one shot" errors or breaches will
not necessarily lead to the market discounting the firm's shares by
a margin sufficient to trigger market-based remedies, unless the
26
market believes that the lapse or violation in question will recur.
True as this is, the market for executive services and internal
monitoring within the firm remain as major constraining forces.
24. See infra text accompanying note 85.
25. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market supra note 3, at 752 &
n.29.
26. Id. at 753-54.

Nor is the incentive to "shirk" nearly as strong as that to place
one's own self-interest above that of the corporation in a selfdealing transaction. The strongest argument for a litigation remedy available to shareholders that can reach the substantive justification for a transaction is to prevent market remedies from
being foreclosed or preempted - such as through "scorched
earth" tactics in response to a takeover bid, greenmail, or a preemptive leveraged buyout. These factors imply to me that the
civil law need only be concerned with violations or negligence
near the top of the corporate hierarchy, where the board's monitoring may be inadequate. Accordingly, the position consistently
taken throughout the various drafts of the ALI's Corporate Governance Project has been that dismissal of derivative actions
against lower echelon corporate officials should be a relatively uncomplicated process, subject only to minimal judicial review under
27
the business judgment rule.

On balance, Professor Cox has shown essentially that Professor
Scott oversimplified his position (a well known, but forgivable, academic trait), but not that a litigation remedy broadly focused on
enforcing the duty of due care is practical or desirable. Nor are
Professor Cox's own contentions immune from criticism. For example, his point that most corporations are not traded on public
markets 28 ignores that the derivative action has essentially functioned as a monitoring mechanism chiefly with respect to publicly
traded corporations. This is probably because the engine that
drives the derivative action - the professional plaintiff's attorney
is only in a position to monitor the behavior of those corporations subject to federal disclosure standards. 29 The underground
railroad that somehow connects these attorneys with eligible
shareholders seldom runs to smaller corporations, probably because of a difference in what the economist would term "search
costs." Whatever the reason, litigation involving closely held cor-

porations has more typically taken the form of either actions for
oppression or liquidation, or actions for fraud based on misrepre27. See Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 4, § 7.03(a)(i). Tentative Draft No. 1
provided that an action brought against persons "other than corporate fiduciaries" (a

term that was not intended to include those "below the level of the board or the senior executives" of the corporation) could be terminated under a business judgment
standard. Id,Council Draft No. 5 refines this approach still further by providing in
section 7.07(a) that in an action against persons other than directors, senior executives, or any person having control of the corporation, or an associate of any of them, a
business judgment standard applies to the judicial review of a termination decision by
either the board or a special litigation committee. Council Draft No. 5, supra note 5,
§ 7.07(a).
28. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market, supra note 3, at 761.
29. Once we view the plaintiff's attorney as a monitoring device (as both Professors Cox and Scott do), it follows that the scope of his monitoring efforts will be influenced by his relative search costs. These costs are lower for publicly held
corporations, which are subject to extensive disclosure requirements. In addition,
there is a well-established tendency for the private enforcer to piggyback on the enforcement efforts of public agencies. I have discussed both these points at length elsewhere. See Coffee, Rescuing the PrivateAttorney Genera" Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215 (1983).
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sentations pertaining to the purchase or sale of securities. These
comments do not imply that the derivative action should not be
fully available to the shareholder in the close corporation, but
they do suggest that the boundaries that Professor Cox described
as limiting the reach of market-based remedies also apply (perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree) to litigation as a monitoring device. Thus, the comparative advantage of the derivative action as a
monitoring mechanism lies in its ability to deter a "one shot"
transaction that will not otherwise trigger an adverse market response or a management ouster.
Ultimately, the central issue that any commentator must face is
whether the prospect of substantial financial liability for directorial and managerial negligence is a sound social policy. For the
following reasons, I believe that Professor Scott is closer to the
truth than Professor Cox, and, as a result, I favor a relatively low
ceiling on the maximum liability for a due-care violation not involving knowing or reckless behavior.
First, from the standpoint of economic theory, directors are
poor cost avoiders. As Professor Cox notes, the standard approach
of economic theory is to ignore fault and look for who is best able
to take action to prevent the loss in question. This approach gives
a new dimension to the argument made by Professor Brudney and
others that directors lack the information and incentive to be able
to monitor effectively behavior that occurs at considerable organizational distance from their level within the corporate hierarchy.30 Although Professor Brudney uses this premise to argue
that little legal weight should be accorded to the judgment of independent directors, its corollary here is that little legal liability
should also attach, unless we are dealing with behavior more culpable than that of negligence. Directors are poor cost avoiders not
only because of their lack of information but also because of their
limited ability to act on the information they do possess.
Although this generalization does not hold as true for illegal actions (where protest is a significant deterrent), 31 the dissenting director can generally do little about a business decision that he
considers to have been poorly conceived or insufficiently
30. See Brudney, supra note 9, at 633. See also Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of CorporateMisconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1131 (1977) (discussing reasons for information blockages
to boards of directors in context of the improper payments controversy).
31. See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). In Barnes, Judge
Learned Hand doubted that the individual director could do much to effect a change
in corporate behavior with respect to an ordinary business decision, but he recognized
that if an illegal act occured, protest would be a sufficient deterrent to satisfy the
proximate causation standard. The facts of Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983), tend
to support this generalization because there a former inside officer's disclosure of the
fraud to Dirks finally ended the scandal. See id. at 3261-66.
105 A1

researched. Possibly in part for this reason, the law on proximate
causation in this context has long been confused and has provided
32
a measure of protection for even the clearly negligent director.
Finally, directors are poor cost-avoiders because of their inability to internalize the costs involved. In this respect, the director is
very different from the auditor or investment banker who can
spread these costs over the many firms he serves. The director is
not a "repeat player" in the same sense that the auditor is because
he can serve only a few corporations. Of course, we could increase
the compensation of directors, but even if this were done by an
order of magnitude directors would still not be in the same position as auditors or investment bankers who can serve many firms.
Nor would we want the individual director to serve multiple firms
in the same manner as the auditor can; no responsible commentator would wish to encourage a return to former practices under
which a single individual often served on a dozen or more boards.
Second, managers and directors are inherently likely to be more
risk averse than shareholders desire, even without the threat of
liability for negligence. Shareholders enjoy limited liability and
also have the ability to diversify their portfolios so as to minimize
the risk of any single investment. Managers cannot diversify their
portfolio equivalently because they are essentially overinvested in
their own firms. 33 From this premise, modern portfolio theory implies that managers are more likely to be risk averse than the
shareholders they represent. Whereas a single bad corporate business decision will have only a minimal effect on fully diversified
shareholders, it can devastate the personal fortunes of the corporation's managers who cannot spread their risks equivalently. In
addition, managers, unlike shareholders, face the potential risk of
individual civil or criminal liability for actions undertaken on be32. Section 7.16(b) of Council DraftNo. 5 addresses this topic and deems adequate
causation to have been shown if (1) the plaintiff can show that "the performance of
the duty would have been a substantial factor in averting the loss," and (2) injury to
the corporation was foreseeable. Notwithstanding Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1924), modern decisions have not permitted a director to escape liability by
arguing that as a lone director he was powerless to cause a change in corporate policy.
See, e.g., Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 1938) (applying duty of ordinary care and diligence to each director); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15,
44-45 432 A.2d 814, 829 (1981) (concluding that even if lone director's mere objection
would not have deterred ongoing fraud, consultation with an attorney and the threat
of suit would have).
33. This theory has been used to explain why managers wish to make conglomerate acquisitions at possibly excessive prices. See Note, The Conflict Between Managers
and Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions: A Portfolio Theory Approach, 88
YALE L.J. 1238 (1979). Because the manager necessarily holds a portfolio that is overinvested in one firm (his own), the manager will seek diversification by causing the
firm to make acquisitions that give him the protection of greater diversification. The
implications of this theory extend beyond acquisitions and cover all risky decisions
generally. In contrast to nondiversified managers, shareholders should be risk neutral if they are diversified. The manager's portfolio is overinvested in his own firm,
both because stock options are typically non-transferable and because, at least for the
more senior manager, his future income will likely be a function of the firm's profitability; in effect, he holds a warrant in the firm, and his economic future is dependent
on the firm, not the economy generally.
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half of their corporation. Also, given the preference for internal
promotion within most firms, 34 the manager laid off by one firm in
the wake of an insolvency or financial crisis has little prospect of
making a costless transfer to another firm at an equivalent level
and salary. As a result, the manager's inability to diversify his
substantial investment in his firm implies that he should be more
risk averse than the shareholders he serves. Adding substantial
financial liability onto this balance would only exacerbate the
problem and make it less likely that managers would act as their
shareholders prefer.
These reasons are distinct from those offered by Professor Scott
because they do rely on the overbroad assertion that market-based
remedies are alone adequate, and they do not challenge the duty
of care as a normative standard. Rather, they simply suggest that
the duty should not be enforced with all the in terroremthreats of
liability that the law could potentially bring to bear.
More importantly, the foregoing arguments do not take me
nearly as far as Professor Scott's analysis leads him because they
have considerably less cogency when applied to one critical component of the duty of due care: the duty to monitor law compliance. Within this special context, directors are better cost
avoiders - in large part, because even an individual director's protest against any impending illegal act is a substantial deterrent. Of
course, directors are not detectives, but they can have a responsibility to set in place internal compliance programs. In addition,
the fact that they may be more risk averse than their shareholders
is not so clearly a vice in this context and may even be thought a
virtue. Otherwise, the limited liability that shareholders enjoy
can result in pressure upon managers to adopt a risk-preferring
posture with respect to law violations. 35 Law violations also represent the quintessential form of "one shot" violations that the market will not necessarily penalize, because a corporate conviction,
even where financially material penalties are involved (as under
the antitrust laws), does not imply that successive prosecutions by
the government are likely. Because the level of financial penalties
to which corporations are typically exposed is often ludicrously
34. For an overview of the managerial labor market, see Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231 (1983). See
also 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 72-81 (1975) (explaining firms' preference for internal promotion on economic

grounds).
35. See, e.g., Coffee, "No Soul to Damn;No Body to Kick-" An UnscandalizedInquiry into the Problemof CorporatePunishment,79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 418-19 (1981);
Kraakman, CorporateLiability Strategiesand the Cost of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J.
857, 865-66, 882 (1984); Stone, The Place of EnterpriseLiability in the Control of Corporate Conduc4 90 YALE L.J. 1, 21 n.82, 34 n.131 (1980).
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below the potential benefits from the misconduct (in large part
because of the effects of inflation on legislatively adopted penalty
structures), deterrence as a practical matter, under our existing
legal structure, can probably only be achieved by focusing on the
individual rather than the entity. The derivative action is one
means to this end, insofar as it can shift penalties levied on the
firm to its senior managers. 36 To be sure, the derivative action is
an awkward and imperfect instrument for achieving law compliance, but, at least with respect to knowing participation in illegal
activities, there is little justification for proposals that would remove even the faint threat of liability that now exists.
I.

Deterrence versus Compensation: The Casefor
Compromise
Professors Cox and Scott again tend to take opposite positions on
the question of the rationale underlying the derivative action. Implicit in Professor Scott's analysis is a deterrent view of the action
in which it serves to penalize unfair self-dealing. He appears to
entertain few doubts about judicial competence and would allow
courts to make fairness decisions without seemingly giving significant weight to the board's judgment. 3 7 Although he recognizes
the potential problem of extortionate and collusive litigation,
he minimizes these problems and pronounces them susceptible to simple solution through devices such as fee shifting and a
percentage-of-the-recovery fee formula.3 In short, he endorses
with little apparent reservation the lawyer as bounty hunter. The
technical problems in his analysis will be deferred to the next sec36. Precedent clearly recognizes that knowing illegality is a violation of the duty
of due care, even if the actor's intent was to profit the corporation. See, e.g., Miller v.

American Tel. & Tel., 507 F.2d 759, 761, 764 (3d Cir. 1974) (failure to collect a debt
owed by the Democratic National Committee for communication services amounting
to illegal corporate campaign contribution); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277,
1283-86 (10th Cir. 1969) (price-fixing scheme); DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 A.D. 206,
209-210, 293 N.Y.S. 912, 916-17 (illegal contract to restrain competition in the manufacture and sale of ice), affd mem, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1937); see also Arsht,
supra note 19, at 129-30 (1980) (where illegality is clear, however, the courts will not
give such conduct by directors the benefit of the business judgment rule).
Professor Scott points out that these decisions, although "included under the 'care'
rubric," involve distinct issues. Scott, supra note 3, at 932 n.21. Perhaps, this means
he would preserve this obligation under a different heading. Professor Cox also attempts to distinguish a number of decisions, especially Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52,
74 N.E.2d 305 (1942), and Miller v. American Tel. & Tel., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence,and the Marke supra note 3 at 764-66. The decisions, however, are more numerous and thus less easily dismissed than his account
suggests. For a fuller treatment of the law in this area, see Coffee, supra note 30, at
1118-27.
37. Scott, supra note 3, at 939-40. Professor Scott asserts, "When shareholders
present to the court an allegation of unfair management dealing, they should expect
the court to exercise its own judgment ...... Id I believe this view is oversimplified
and certainly is more radical than anything proposed in the ALI's Corporate Governance Project. If the court were to use only its own judgment, the board would have no
role and its approval would be superfluous. The more sensible position is for the
court to determine if the challenged transaction was within a range of fairness, such
that truly disinterested directors would have authorized the transaction.
38. Id at 942-43.
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tion, but this description is sufficient to show his distance from
Professor Cox.
Although Professor Cox also recognizes the deterrent role of
the derivative action (indeed, his economic analysis of that role is,
I believe, the real strength of his current piece), he criticizes the
ALI's Corporate Governance Project in this area for tilting too far
in the direction of a deterrent rationale. A lengthy section of his
article sets forth a narrow reading of some, but far from all, of the
decisions that have legitimized this deterrent role. 39 Yet, he never
turns an equally skeptical eye to the basic question of the feasibility of a compensatory rationale. The core problem is not simply
that there is little visible evidence that substantial recoveries have
ever been obtained in cases not involving some element of suspected self-dealing; rather, the problem is equally that the source
of any recovery is ultimately the officers' and directors' liability
insurance policy that virtually all public corporations today carry
for their officials. Because the premiums on these policies are typically paid by the corporations, these corporations are simply
funding their own recovery. Conceptually, it would be far simpler
and more direct if the corporation just insured itself against loss
due to the negligent acts or omissions of its agents, rather than
using the circular procedure of insuring its agents and then suing
them for damages that only the insurance policy it purchased can
cover. 40 This existing approach, of the principal suing its agent in
39. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence,and the Market; supra note 3, at 763-776.
40. Liability insurance does make it potentially possible for the corporation to
recover substantial amounts from its own officers and directors. For example, Chase
Manhattan Bank has recently sued six former senior officers, including two former
executive vice presidents, for $175 million in losses allegedly incurred by Chase in
connection with the failure of the Penn Square Bank. Allegedly these officers negligently accepted loans from Penn Square without adequate documentation. Obviously,
few employees have pockets that deep, but the former officers were covered by insurance policies totaling $140 million. See Glaberson, Is Chase Opening the Gates to Negligence Suits by the Boss?, Bus. WK., Nov. 5, 1984, at 39. In this light, liability
insurance can serve the same function as a surety bond on lower echelon employees.
But, officers' liability insurance also has a more problematic effect and may give
rise to a "moral hazard" problem, because such insurance today covers precisely the
same liabilities against which indemnification was statutorily denied. See Note, Public Policyand Directors'LiabilityInsurance,67 COLUM. L. REv. 716,729 (1967). Since
director and officer insurance first appeared in the early 1960s, its popularity has increased enormously so that today it is comparatively rare for directors to be uninsured. Obviously, such insurance serves a compensatory purpose, but it also
undercuts the deterrent purpose of the derivative action by reducing the threat of
individual liability. If instead, the corporation were insured and the insurance company given a right of subrogation against the individual defendant, then both compensatory and deterrent goals could be achieved. The danger in this approach is, of
course, that it may make corporate officials excessively risk averse. See Schuck,
Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress and the Liability of Public Officials for
Damages,1980 SuP. CT. REV. 281, 309-312 (cataloguing risks in permitting tort actions
against governmental officials). It is not feasible to assess this danger, but clearly it is
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order to recover against the latter's insurance policy that the principal purchased, has a level of complexity that only Rube
Goldberg could admire.
If we are to re-examine the fundamental premises underlying
the use of litigation (as both Professors Cox and Scott seem prepared to do), I suggest we must recognize that compensation to the
firm for negligence necessarily requires insurance. If this premise
is granted, then we must ask whether we need the derivative action as the means best suited to raise claims against the insurer.
In theory, one can imagine alternative forms of insurance under
which shareholders sought payment directly from the insurer
(either for themselves or the corporation) without the board having to concede that the firm had in fact been damaged through the
board's own acts or omissions. Thus, litigation could occur between the insurance company and a group of shareholders seeking
to represent the firm. Much of the procedural complexity surrounding the derivative action could then wither away. Of course,
all this may sound hopelessly visionary, but in terms of the theoretical arguments that Professor Cox has raised, the case for a
compensatory rationale seems particularly weak. If one believes
that a compensatory system to safeguard shareholders against
managerial negligence or recklessness is needed, the most logical
means to this end would be through insurance, not litigation. To
be sure, portfolio diversification is a solution for shareholders, but
at least for creditors, employees, and other managers (all of whom
may not be able to minimize their risk through diversification),
the availability of insurance would offer some protection. Paradoxically, however, these are exactly the classes that lack standing
to commence a derivative action.4 1 My claim here is certainly not
that compensation for those injured by negligence is undesirable;
but rather, that the justification for intra-corporate litigation cannot be grounded satisfactorily on a compensatory rationale.
For those who find the foregoing arguments too theoretical,
there is a simpler explanation for why a compensatory rationale
cannot serve as the primary justification for a litigation remedy.
Fundamental problems with a compensatory rationale come into
more present in tort actions against corporate directors than against accountants and
other "repeat players" who can better internalize these costs.
41. The widely prevailing rule is that only a current equity shareholder who held
his shares contemporaneously with the time of the alleged wrong can maintain a derivative action. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 49 (1979); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 626(b) (McKinney 1963). Some decisions have expanded this rule to cover various
classes of beneficial holders. See Jones v. Taylor, 348 A.2d 188, 191-92 (Del. Ch. 1975).

Creditors are, however, still denied standing. See Dodge v. First Wisconsin Trust Co.,
394 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215,218-19 (Del.

Ch. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). Some have criticized this
rule. See Note, Creditors' Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Corporations,88
YALE L.J. 1299 (1979) (arguing that derivative suits by creditors would both deter
corporate misconduct and protect creditors from the increased risk caused by the depletion of assets through mismanagement). I think the rule is basically sound, given
the risk averse stance of the creditor and his predictable willingness to seek to block
or to attack higher risk transactions that promise him no corresponding gain.
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focus once we recognize that ultimately shareholders are the injured victims of managerial negligence or misconduct. Yet, given
the existence of secondary securities markets, the class of shareholders who bear the loss are not the same as the class who receive the recovery. These two classes overlap only imperfectly
and thus some receive a windfall. Yet, if we reduce the recovery
to adjust for this factor, we also reduce the deterrent sanction and
thereby create an incentive for misconduct. Professor Cox seems
to suggest that the use of pro rata recoveries under which former
shareholders would receive their proportionate share of the damages would solve this problem.4 But this may be too simple a solution for several reasons. First, desirable as pro rata recoveries
are in some cases, they invariably direct some portion of the recovery away from the firm, and thus tend to injure creditors and
others dependent on the firm's solvency. Second, it is extremely
difficult to identify the shareholders who were truly injured by
the fiduciary breach and who merit the individual recovery, because it is not necessarily the shareholders who held at the time of
the injury but instead those who bought before and sold after the
market's negative reaction to the discovery of the wrong who were
most injured. Third, the market loss of these shareholders may be
greater or lesser than the injury done to the firm, depending on
the market's reaction - which will likely be influenced by the
market's judgment as to whether the loss is likely to recur in the
future or is, instead, a one-shot transaction. Thus, a $100,000 loss
to the firm could cause a $1,000,000 loss to shareholders in the
form of a decreased stock price if the market anticipates repetition. One cannot compensate for such a loss under a system that
directs the compensation to the firm. In short, the problems of
equitably distributing the recovery under a compensatory rationale are probably beyond the practical capacity of the derivative
action.
What then should be the relationship between the compensatory and deterrent rationales for intra-corporate litigation? Pursued dogmatically, either rationale can lead to absurd results, as
discussed below. Rather than follow either principle to the limits
of its logic, the sounder course is to compromise by treating the
compensatory rationale as primarily a limit on the deterrent justification. Alone, a deterrent rationale can justify a corporation expending almost any sum to bring a wrongdoer to account; whereas,
a compensatory rationale gives the defendant a strategic incentive
to threaten to conduct a prolonged and expensive defense. For
example, assume a corporate official has embezzled $200,000 in a
42. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence,and the Marke4 supra note 3, at 774-75.

1984]

complicated fraud. Ex ante, a compensatory rationale could justify
expenditures of up to $199,999 to recover that sum; any greater
expenditures, however, would not produce a net recovery. Under
this logic, shareholders would be better off if the wrong is not rectified than if more money is wasted. Yet, this logic also implies
that as long as a defendant can make it expensive for the corporation to win a litigated recovery against him, he (or a special litigation committee intent on protecting him) can cite these same
expenses as a justification for a corporate termination of the action, even though the fiduciary breach was open and notorious.
The rebuttal to this argument is well elaborated in Professor
Cox's article.43 If we posit that the corporate expenditures in the
litigation will discourage other potential wrongdoers, then it follows that such expenditures reduce the average agency cost that
shareholders must incur in order to hold their management accountable, even if they do not produce a compensatory benefit. As
is implicit in Professor Cox's analysis, the fully diversified shareholder may benefit even if $300,000 is expended to recover
$200,000.
The problem with the deterrent rationale, however, is that it is
open-ended: one does not know whether expenditures of $400,000,
$500,000 or even more would also produce a deterrent benefit in
excess of the costs incurred. Nor can one begin to estimate the
marginal deterrent benefit, if any, of each additional successful derivative action. Finally, the greatest problem with a singleminded focus on systematic risk and average agency cost is that
not all (and probably not most) shareholders are fully diversified.44 These shareholders lose, rather than gain, when the corporate recovery falls below the corporation's expenditures in a
derivative action, even if a deterrent surplus is created that benefits the other, fully diversified shareholders. For all these reasons,
a deterrent rationale should be constrained by a compensatory
ceiling. Clearly at some point a disproportion between the expected costs and the expected recovery should justify dismissal,
even if the action is a legally meritorious one. One cannot define
with precision where this point lies and, because of this indeterminacy, one must rely upon judicial discretion. As a result, Part VII
of the Principles of Corporate Governance does not attempt any
precise balancing formula between the two rationales but instead
contemplates case-by-case judicial balancing.
43. Id.at 782.
44. Most investors are not fully diversified because they hold assets other than
marketable securities, such as real estate, insurance, pensions, or small business holdings. As a result, they may wish to hold an undiversified securities portfolio to wrap
around their other investment assets in order to achieve full diversification on an
overall level. I have developed this theme elsewhere. See Coffee, Market Failureand
the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 748-49
(1984).
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III. From Theory to Practice: The View from Part VII
Stripped of their rhetoric, Professors Cox's and Scott's main criticisms of the specific proposals made in Part VII basically boil
down to the following. Professor Scott believes we have been
overly timid and have given too much credence to the possibility
of extortionate or frivolous litigation. Thus, within the duty of
loyalty area, he criticizes us for unnecessarily limiting and burdening the plaintiff's ability to maintain a derivative action. 45 Conversely, Professor Cox thinks we have been overly aggressive in
pursuing a deterrent rationale but also too restrictive with respect
to duty-of-care litigation. He thus disagrees both with Part VII's
proposed ceiling on liability for negligence and with the provision
that instructs a court not to dismiss a derivative action if to do so
46
would "frustrate any authoritatively established public policy."
It is easier to engage the criticisms of each separately, although in
substance, the same positions are being defended against attacks
from diametrically opposed directions.
A.

What PriceDeterrence?: A Response to Professor Scott

That deterrence is necessary and can be achieved through the format of the derivative action are not issues on which Professor
Scott and I differ. We also appear to agree that the action against
the control group for a duty-of-loyalty violation presents the
strongest justification for the existence of the derivative action as
a monitoring mechanism. But here, as elsewhere, deterrence can
come at too high a price. In abstract theory, the hanging of an
innocent man should produce deterrence (if his innocence could
be hidden) and could be justified under a cold-blooded utilitarian
logic. 47 Similarly, forcing a corporate fiduciary to pay a settlement

under fear of what an unpredictable jury might do seems unjust,
at least when the original transaction was at a price equivalent to
what fully informed parties trading at arm's length would negotiate. Yet, by empowering the court to determine the fairness of all
transactions between the corporation and members of the control
group and not according weight to the board's prior determination, Professor Scott would invite this problem. One must ask,
45. Scott, supra note 3, at 944-46.
46. Professor Cox is here criticizing the phrasing in Council Draft No. 3, supra
note 5, § 7.08(a)(3). This provision was formerly section 7.03(c)(ii)(B) of Tentative
Draft No. 1. However, the current version of this language in Council Draft No. 5 is
different. It bars termination when dismissal would "frustrate any legal rule that
operates for the protection of shareholders." Council Draft No. 5, supra note 5,
§ 7.08(a)(4).
47. John Rawls put forth (and rebutted) this argument. See Rawls, Punishment
from Two Concepts of Rules, in PUNISHMENT 58, 60-62 (J. Feinberg and H. Gross eds.
1975).
l10QA1
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therefore, if he has adequately considered the danger of frivolous
or extortionate litigation.
In fact, Professor Scott appears to have little interest in addressing these problems and would wholly reject the device of the special litigation committee. He writes: "A simple answer to all these
problems is a rule that the board (or any variant thereof) cannot
terminate a derivative suit. This rule... would leave a dismissal
of a derivative action to the discretion of the courts, as with any
other lawsuit. '48 If our legal system could be redesigned from the
ground up, one could make a strong argument for. treating the derivative action like "any other lawsuit." But so long as the possibility that courts may err remains with us, one must recognize
that the derivative action is not in fact like "any other lawsuit" in
several important respects. What is most unique about the derivative action is the breadth of standing it theoretically confers on
shareholders to challenge virtually any transaction in which the
corporation engages. As a result, a minimally creative pleader can
potentially bring before a court any significant decision reached by
senior corporate management. In contrast, other forms of intracorporate litigation focus on relatively narrow transactions - the
purchase or sale of securities, the solicitation of proxies, or the
making of a tender offer.49 The universality of its scope thus distinguishes the derivative action and justifies concern about excessive reliance on it - unless one believes that courts can decide
cases without error.
In addition, courts are traditionally hostile toward the use of
summary judgment and similar pretrial motions for dismissal.
Regrettably, courts are simply too familiar with the proposition
that factual disputes are to be resolved at trial to expect them to
screen actions on their own by evaluating the action's likely merit
and dismissing those in which the probable recovery would be substantially below the probable corporate expenditures. Accordingly, even a nonmeritorious action has a nuisance value. To be
sure, this is a generic problem, which is not limited to the derivative action; but the uniquely broad reach of the derivative action
and the superficiality of the injury required to give standing
makes the need for a screening procedure more compelling in this
context if procedure is not to dominate over substance. In this
light, thekey attraction of the standing doctrine, under which the
board has power to reject the plaintiff's demand, is that it serendipitously supplies a doctrinal foundation that courts can use to
justify such an early screening. So viewed, Professor Scott misses
the forest for the trees when he criticizes the elaborate procedural
restrictions that surround the derivative action in much the same
overprotective manner as sand traps guard the green on a champi48. Scott, supra note 3, at 945 (original emphasis).
49. For example, under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff can state a cause of action only if
the misstatement or omission occurred in connection with a purchase or sale of a security. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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onship golf course. 50 Justifiable as his criticisms are on an individual basis, they ignore the subtler point that, absent a reliable
screening mechanism, corporate officials would be exposed to
nearly constant litigation. Of course, we have such a screening
mechanism today in the form of the special litigation committee,
but it is such an overbroad mechanism that it is susceptible to
great abuse. One might even debate whether a bad screening
mechanism is worse than none at all, but a choice between all or
nothing is unrealistic and unnecessary. If the device were wholly
eliminated (as Professor Scott proposes), and any lawyer could file
a derivative action without the "formality" of a client (as Professor Scott favors), then the resulting litigation explosion might
soon terrify courts back into their former posture of near absolute
deference to the board. Real reform, then, requires that we candidly face the problem of nonmeritorious litigation.
Professor Scott is not unaware that nonmeritorious litigation is
often initiated and may induce risk-averse defendants to agree to a
settlement. But, in response, he claims that "the legal system has
evolved ways for defendants to attack groundless suits and obtain
their dismissal at early stages in litigation (demurrer, motion for
summary judgment) and to impose penalties on plaintiffs for
abuse of the legal process." 5' Here, I submit, he has overstated the
adequacy of our existing system of sanctions substantially; conversely, Professor Cox is unduly pessimistic about the capacity of
the legal system to develop an early screening mechanism. 52 To
believe that a motion for summary judgment will frequently be
granted in a complex case involving the fairness of a self-dealing
transaction, one has to blind oneself to a great deal of evidence
that our legal system is not currently dealing adequately with the
problem of litigation abuse (either by plaintiffs or defendants).
The successes in this area have been very few indeed. Perhaps in
consequence, courts have legitimized the special-litigation committee and some have accepted the blatantly overbroad thesis,
which is enunciated in its most extreme form in Auerbach v.
Bennett,53 that the board has the same business judgment discretion to reject a derivative action as it does to make ordinary deci50. See Scott, supra note 3, at 941-42.
51. Scott, Corporation Law, The American Law Institute and the New Institutional Economics, Working Paper No. 9, Law and Economics Program, Stanford Law
School 25 (1983) (unpublished manuscript). The quoted statement does not appear in
the final published version of Professor Scott's article but appeared in this earlier,
widely circulated Working Paper.
52. See Cox, supra note 3, at 783-87. Professor Cox contends that if the ALI's
Reporters were serious about the desirability of an early screening mechanism, we
would permit the defendant to raise such a liberalized motion for summary judgment.
For a response to this claim see supra note 7.
53. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629-30, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
1 QA'
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sions not involving any element of self-dealing. Easy as it is to
criticize courts on this score, the real dilemma is that they have
not had adequate alternatives available to them. The experience
of courts with imposing penalties against attorneys who act in an
unreasonable manner has reached only the embryonic stage, and
the idea of fee shifting along the lines of the English rule is both
anathema to most of the Bar and inconsistent with the contingent
fee system that Professor Scott describes as the common law's efficient answer5 4
If Professor Scott's summary of the law's capacity to deal with
the nonmeritorious action seems overconfident, he is even more
sanguine in his predictions about defendants' behavior. Defendants, he says, would learn to resist extortionate litigation and to
call plaintiff's "bluff" because defendants are repeat players who
know that if they "choose to pay off on suits without merit [they]
will soon find that their number is infinite." 55 This explanation is
much too simple. In fact, the empirical evidence today shows that
defendants in derivative actions are not repeat players, because
the odds are quite low that any one corporation will be sued repetitively with respect to different transactions. The best known empirical study found that the typical firm would be involved in a
derivative action only once every 17.5 years as long as the rate that
prevailed between 1971 and 1978 continues.56 Of course, this rate
may change (particularly if Professor Scott's approach were
adopted), but any substantial increase would also mean that directors who today face only a limited exposure to litigation (whatever
their subjective sense) would truly enter a world in which they
were repeat players facing a recurrent threat of litigation. Unlike
auditors or other professionals, directors cannot spread the risk
over multiple firms. For most outside directors, there is probably
no realistic risk premium that could compensate them adequately
and thus, the composition of the typical board would shift in the
direction of risk preference as the more risk-averse directors fled
the board. Even if an adequate risk premium existed, the possible
54. Scott, supra note 3, at 940. Professor Scott is quite correct that the derivative
suit is a solution to the free-rider problem that hobbles effective opposition by minority shareholders. But, so long as a contingent fee system is essential to the enforcement of derivative actions, the English rule of fee shifting would deter most plaintiffs

from commencing such an action, because the nominal plaintiff stands to receive no
portion of the recovery in a derivative action (if successful) and yet would be liable for

the other side's attorneys' fees (if unsuccessful). Even if the lawyer could enforce the
action himself (without the need for a client), a substantial asymmetry would remain
because the defendants' fees would typically exceed the expected fee award to the
plaintiff. In any event, the very hostile reaction that the recently proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 encountered before it was withdrawn
shows that the Bar is unlikely to accept fee shifting as a general rule. See Committee
on Rules Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draftof ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,98
F.R.D. 339, 361-67 (1983). For a critique, see Note, The Impact of ProposedRule 68 on
Civil Rights Litigation, 843 COLUM. L. REV. 719 (1984).
55. Scott, supra note 3, at 942.
56. See Jones, An Empirical Examinationof the Incidence of ShareholderDerivative and Class Action Lawsuits 1971-1978, 60 B.U.L. REV. 306, 312-13 (1980).
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additional compensation required to induce directors to accept this
increased risk could well exceed any reduction in unfair selfdealing, and this risk premium might increase, rather than decrease, average agency costs.5 7 In short, the criticisms made earlier of Professor Cox's proposals for a more zealous enforcement
of the duty of due care also have relevance to Professor Scott's
brave new world in that the effect of his proposals could prove
perversely counter-productive to his goals. Nor is it a sufficient
difference that Professor Scott would confine litigation to the duty
of loyalty. Some conflict-laden areas - such as executive compensation - are as unavoidable as death and taxes; and thus, for example, the directors who set compensation levels would become
inevitable targets.
If one wishes to choose between extreme alternatives, I suppose
that in the last analysis I would prefer Professor Scott's proposals
to the law of Auerbach v. Bennett. But such a choice is unnecessary. The sensible alternative is to convert the special-litigationcommittee device from an insurmountable barrier into a screening
mechanism that requires courts to evaluate at an early stage the
probable merit of the action.58 Of course, such judgments will be
based on imperfect information and will frequently be erroneous.
But the risk of error pervades this area, and by granting courts
this discretion we are in effect balancing one type of error against
59
another.
Finally, Professor Scott is equally unconvincing with respect to
the problem of collusive settlements that has long plagued the de57. Professor Cox gives the tradeoff too little attention in his analysis of average
agency costs. If we ask directors to bear the increased risk for negligence, we either
have to expect that they will demand increased compensation or, if not, that a shift
will occur in the composition of the typical board toward those having a high tolerance for risk. Risk-preferring directors would hardly seem the ideal candidates for a
monitoring role.
58. Of course, the crux of this conversion is to transfer discretion from the board
to the court, so that the termination decision would essentially rest on a judicial determination that the action was either likely to be nonmeritorious or that other reasons
made its continuation harmful to the corporation's best interests.
59. One must balance errors of underinclusion against errors of overinclusion.
Underinclusion occurs when the court erroneously predicts that the action has little
prospect of success and so dismisses it, even though fuller discovery would have
shown that substantial evidence supported the plaintiff's position. The second type of
error occurs when the action is permitted to proceed and plaintiffs negotiate a
favorable settlement from risk-averse defendants although they would have been unable to prove their case at trial. Of course, the more discovery the court permits, the
greater the likelihood of a more accurate decision and the incidence of error is minimized. But one cannot stop with this observation. Discovery occurs over time and is
costly; moreover, the longer the action proceeds, the greater the likelihood that plaintiffs' leverage will be increased and that defendants will be compelled to settle. In
general, in making a screening decision, the court needs to balance the desirability of
some discovery against the danger that extended discovery will defeat the purpose of
an early screening mechanism.
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rivative suit context. His answer again is simple: switch from the
current time-based "lodestar" system of compensating the plaintiffs' attorney to a percentage-of-the-recovery formula.60 Once
this is done, he implies, the plaintiffs' attorney would no longer
have an incentive to swap a low recovery (to the corporation) in
return for a high attorneys' fee award (to himself); instead, the
attorney's interests and those of the shareholders would be
aligned. This proposal is, however, less optimal than it first
sounds. Well known economics literature has long argued that a
formula based on a percentage of the recovery creates an incentive
for premature settlements at inadequate amounts that are below
that at which the class would settle if it had the ability to control
its attorney's actions.6 1 In effect, when we shift from a time-based
formula to a formula based on a percentage of the recovery we are
simply exchanging one conflict of interest for another: under both
formulas, the attorney has an incentive to accept a settlement offer that the class would refuse had it the ability to do so. It may
well be that there is a case for re-introducing a percentage-of-therecovery component into the case law on attorneys' fees (and
Council DraftNo. 5 does this),6 2 but the irony here is that Professor Scott is proposing the one reform that would reduce settlement size and hence the deterrent value of the derivative action.
In the last analysis, Professor Scott's premises are sound at least
in terms of his desire to focus the litigation remedy on the control
group and the duty of loyalty. At the implementation level, however, the means he chooses do not lead to the ends he seeks.
B. Professor Cox's Critique
Professor Cox's specific disagreements with former Council Draft
No. 3 center largely around two provisions: the "frustration of
public policy" exception to the board's power to terminate derivative litigation,6 and the proposed ceiling on damages for due
60. Scott, supra note 3, at 941, 943.
61. See Clermont & Currivan, Improving the ContingentFee, 63 CORNELL L. REV.
529, 536, 543-46 (1978) (summarizing earlier economics literature). A bias toward
early settlements that do not maximize the recovery to the class is said to exist be-

cause the increase in the expected attorney's fee from continuing to litigate (rather
than settle) the action will often not equal the attorney's opportunity costs over the
period of the delay.
62. In section 7.18(a)(i), Council Draft No. 5 permits the court to increase the
attorney's fee over and above the level justified on a time formula basis in order to
reflect "the nature of the results obtained." This approach is substantially in accord
with the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420
A.2d 142, 153 (Del. 1980), which rejected the lodestar approach and authorized the
court to adjust the fee award upward to reward the attorney for the benefit obtained.
63. Council Draft No. 3, supra note 5, § 7.08(a)(3). This restriction has support in
the case law. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981) (emphasizing that before dismissing an
action on the board's recommendation the trial court should give "special consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests"). In his criticisms of this section of Council Draft No. 3, Professor Cox gives
little attention to Zapataand ignores Galef.
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care.6 4 Basically, he overreads the former, which has in any event
been revised in Council DraftNo. 5,65 and overreacts to the latter,
which has precedent in terms of a similar
ceiling proposed by the
66
ALT in its FederalSecurities Code.
1.

Frustrationof an Authoritatively EstablishedPublicPolicy

Section 7.08(a)(3) of Council DraftNo. 3 instructed the court not
to dismiss a derivative action based upon the board's determination that the action is adverse to its interests if to do so would
"frustrate any authoritatively established public policy."6 7 To
Professor Cox, this language implies that the corporation, at considerable cost to itself, must permit the plaintiff to prosecute any
action involving an alleged criminal violation or any violation of a
similar statute embodying a public policy. If indeed this language
did turn the corporation into an engine for the discovery of corporate misbehavior and did convert the derivative action into a private grand jury proceeding, it should give cause for alarm.
However, such a reading exaggerates by a considerable margin
what can reasonably be implied from these words. First, the word
"frustrate" is itself a transitive verb that connotes considerably
more than an insensitivity to a particular public policy. That a
conflict can be perceived between a board's decision and a public
policy does not mean that the latter is "frustrated." It is difficult
to see how a board's judgment that a particular action was nonmeritorious or that it resulted in costs vastly disproportionate to
its benefits could be said to "frustrate" most public policies. Second, the current draft has replaced the term "established public
policy" with the phrase "frustrate
any legal rule that operates for
' 68
the protection of shareholders.
64. This ceiling was originally in section 7.06 of Tentative Draft No. 1. In a substantially revised form it is now section 7.17 of Council DraftNo. 5. As of the date of
this Article, the Council of American Law Institute has yet to consider this revised
proposal.
65. See supra note 46.
66. FED. SEC. CODE § 1708(c)(2) (1980) (limiting damages for an individual defendant with respect to liability for an individual filing or misrepresentation or omission to
the greater of $100,000 or any profit attributable thereto). This section would not
apply if the defendant made a "misrepresentation made with knowledge by the particular defendant." Id The $100,000 limit was subsequently raised to $200,000 after negotiations with the SEC before the Code was submitted to Congress.
67. Council Draft No. 3, supra note 5, § 7.08(a). Section 7.08(a)(3) provided that:
"the court should dismiss the action.., if it finds that:
(3) dismissal of the action would not frustrate any authoritatively established public policy."
This same provision was contained in section 7.03(c)(ii)(B) of Tentative Draft No. 1.
68. Council Draft No. 5, supra note 5, § 7.08(a)(4).
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Ironically, this provision strikes me as precisely the sort of limitation on the board's power to terminate a derivative action that
Professor Cox would seem to be contemplating when he develops
his "average agency cost" rationale for shareholder litigation. The
likely application of this standard becomes clearer when we consider those legal rules that particularly relate to the protection of
shareholders. For example, most statutes on indemnification prohibit indemnification of a corporate officer's litigation expenses in
a derivative action when the officer is adjudged, in the same proceeding, to have breached a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation.69 Assume, however, that the directors of a corporation
decide to indemnify a corporate official for $150,000 of litigation
expenses incurred by him in a derivative action in which he was
adjudged liable to the corporation. Such action would, of course,
flout the legislative policy against indemnification in this instance,
but the directors would have violated no criminal statute and no
civil remedy would apply. The directors could, of course, be sued
derivatively, but in any subsequent derivative action commenced
against them, one might well argue that the potential recovery to
the corporation (the wrongfully paid $150,000 indemnification)
would be less than the financial and time expenditures needed to
litigate the action. Here, the "frustration" standard would typically apply to preclude termination of the action, because the legislative ban on such indemnification payments would, on these
facts, have been frustrated by the termination of the derivative
action. Phrased differently, this is a situation in which (in Professor Cox's own terminology) the average agency costs of corporate
governance are reduced by insisting that the action proceed.
A different and potentially more controversial example is
presented by the facts of the landmark case of Garner v.
Wolfinbarger.70 There, in a derivative action that made important
law on the scope of the attorney-client privilege, the plaintiff
sought to uncover what had happened to substantial corporate
funds that had been paid out in questionable transactions. In a
deposition taken in that case, a corporate official acknowledged
that approximately $50,000 had been paid to the Attorney General
of Alabama.7 1 Suppose at this point with this evidence in the record, the corporation sought to terminate the action on the grounds
that its continuation would stigmatize the corporation and interfere with its method of doing business. I submit that a court that
69.
70.
waived
71.

See supra note 17.
430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that attorney-client privilege could be
for good cause in a derivative action), cert denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
The former president of First American Life Insurance Co. of Mobile,

Alabama, testified that, in return for a $50,000 loan and certain other consideration,
the Attorney General of Alabama (who was also the Securities Commissioner of
Alabama) had approved a stock offering by the company. See Patrick, Limitationson
a Corporation'sClaim of Attorney-ClientPrivilegeor Work-ProductPrivilegein Litigation Between the Corporation and the Stockholders; Garner v. Wolfinbarger and
Related Cases in D. BLOCK & J. SOLOVY, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE 405 (PLI 1984). See also Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 56 F.R.D. 499
(S.D. Ala. 1972). Mr. Patrick was the attorney for plaintiffs in this action.

816

VOL. 52:789

Between Scylla and Charybdis
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON

LAW REVIEW

dismissed the action on this justification would in effect be sweeping a half-uncovered scandal back under the rug. Such conduct
could well undermine public confidence in the judiciary. Once
private disputes are brought into a public courtroom, a limited
public interest must be recognized as attaching to the process by
which they are resolved. This public interest does not require that
every cause of action be litigated to the hilt at whatever the cost to
the corporation and its shareholders, but it does necessitate that
courts conduct their business in a seemly fashion. If a court is told
that bribery is a profitable (albeit illegal) means of doing business
and that the corporation has no plans to discontinue these practices, that court is morally compromised if it thereupon dismisses
the action.
The difficult issue then is how to permit the court to protect its
own integrity without requiring it to resolve disputes involving asserted public policies that a shareholder owning a single share and
having ulterior motives might wish to see enforced. The derivative
action is clearly a poorly adapted mechanism by which to resolve
disputes involving, for example, environmental, civil rights, or labor laws. Yet, unless some dividing line is recognized, it might be
possible to dress up disputes that fundamentally involved these
issues as derivative actions in order to focus liability on directors
who will typically be more risk averse than their firm. What distinguishes the Garnercase discussed above from some hypothetical derivative action alleging environmental violations or
employment discrimination is that the defendants in Garner appeared to have engaged in conduct that both injured shareholders
and disregarded the most basic norms of accountability by perpetuating a fraudulent system of accounting. Thus, I believe that,
properly interpreted, a standard that precluded termination when
it would "frustrate a legal rule that operates for the protection of
shareholders" would require a court to hear the merits of a
Garnertype case; yet, this same standard would permit early dismissal in a case where the claimed violation of laws involved employment discrimination, labor, or environmental statutes. This is
not to say that any form of knowing illegality that causes or
threatens loss to the corporation is beyond the reach of the derivative action, but only that in cases outside the scope of the foregoing "frustration" exception, the court may permit an early
termination based on grounds advanced by the special-litigation
committee and the court is not compelled to inquire fully into the
merits of the action.
2. The Ceiling on Due-CareLiability
The proposal made in Tentative DraftNo. 1, that a relatively low
ceiling be placed on the liability of corporate officials for negli1984]
817

gence, has encountered considerable opposition - symptomatically, both from those who favor and oppose liability for
negligence.7 2 That strange bedfellows have united to criticize this
idea illustrates the "fear of articulation" theme that has characterized much of the opposition to the ALI's Corporate Governance
Project.7 3 For example, a committee of the American Bar
Association has opposed a low ceiling on liability, worrying that
74
such a ceiling might make courts more prepared to find liability.
Yet, if this curious logic were followed to its conclusion, those who
wish to minimize the likelihood of liability for negligence should
propose capital punishment as the penalty for negligence. Conversely, Professors Brudney and Cox have correctly recognized
that any such ceiling reduces the expected recovery and therefore
the proposal would facilitate the termination of due-care cases by
75
the special-litigation-committee device.
Who is correct - the ABA Committee or Professor Cox who
worries that such a ceiling would abolish all liability for negligence? In fact, both have a piece of the answer, but in each case
they have not considered the full implications of the proposal.
Conceivably, a ceiling on liability might, in some instances, make a
court more prepared to impose liability because it would not have
to impose potentially crushing liability on individuals who did not
appear culpable in the usual sense of that term. I will not dwell
on this judicial nullification thesis - that courts are reluctant to
impose penalties that are disproportionate to the actor's culpabil72. Professor Cox opposes the ceiling because it would reduce liability for negligence. Conversely, the Committee on Corporate Counsel of the American Bar Association has recently prepared a report, which was approved by the Section of Litigation
of the ABA, that argues against the ceiling on precisely the opposite grounds: that it

would increase the prospect of liability for negligence. See American Bar Association,
Section of Litigation's Consolidated Comments to the American Law Institute Project
on "Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations," 250-56
(1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA, Section of Litigation's Consolidated Comments].
The report argues that "the imposition of a ceiling would ... have precisely the detrimental effects on our business and economic system which the Reporters now say can
only be avoided by its adoption, i.e., a decreased willingness of independent directors
to serve and excessive risk aversion by all corporate officials in the decisionmaking."
I& at 256. This position wholly ignores the effect of the ceiling on the termination
decision for which the court must balance the probable recovery (necessarily diminished under a ceiling) against the expenses to the corporation from the action's continuation; termination also becomes easier when the expected recovery is reduced by
a ceiling. In addition, a ceiling also creates a disincentive for the plaintiff's attorney to
litigate due-care cases, because a lower recovery implies a lower attorney's fee.
Professor Scott also seems to have missed this point. His only comment about the
ceiling is that it will reduce the derivative action's "compensatory potential further."
Scott, supra note 3, at 936 n.36. Yet, from his perspective, this is more a virtue than a
vice.
73. See supra text accompanying note 1. Given that a ceiling on liability for innocent misrepresentation under Rule 10b-5 was broadly welcomed in the ALI's Federal
Securities Code, see infra note 85, this reaction seems reflexive and unthinking.
74. See ABA, Section of Litigation's Consolidated Comments, supra note 72, at
250-56.
75. Brudney, supra note 1, at 230 n.29, 232, 241; Cox, supra note 3. Professor
Brudney characterizes us as having proposed only an "iron lung.., in which to preserve the increasingly moribund derivative suit. . .

."

Brudney, supra note 1, at 232.
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ity - because I have developed it elsewhere. 7 6 Apparently, the
ABA Committee and others have found this argument so persuasive that they are scared of the ceiling. Yet, even if this possibility
is conceded, imposing a ceiling does not therefore make the status
of the director more risky. Any increase in the risk of an adjudication of liability should be more than offset by a decrease in the
magnitude of the sanction. If we assume that directors are risk
averse (which means technically that they fear a combination of
severe penalties coupled with a low probability of their imposition
more than they fear an alternative combination of more modest
penalties coupled with a higher probability of imposition), 77 then
the impact of a ceiling would be to mitigate the deterrent threat
focused on the risk averse director, even if the combination of
probability and severity levels yielded the same product.
Professor Cox opposes this proposal that the law not resort to
threatening penalty levels for liability for negligence. He observes, as Council DraftNo. 5 explicitly states, that a ceiling would
facilitate the termination of due-care actions because it would reduce the expected recovery that the court would consider in determining whether the action's costs exceeded its expected
recovery.78 However, this reduction would be marginal, and it is a
serious overstatement to view a ceiling as equivalent to the abolition of financial penalties for the duty of due care.
Three reasons support this assessment. First, because a ceiling
would be computed against the liability of each individual defendant, the total recovery to the corporation would be the product of
76. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit-An Evaluation
andProposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUm. L. REV. 261, 309 (1981). Although the
ABA Section of Litigation's Consolidated Comments, supra note 72, has used this
same argument to support its thesis that a ceiling would increase the prospect of liability for negligence, it confuses apples and oranges in doing so. A ceiling might well
result in a few more reported decisions imposing liability, but one cannot judge the
total impact of the change from this ex post perspective. Instead, from an ex ante
perspective, one must look at the impact on the incentive held out to the plaintiffs'
attorney to litigate such cases, which would be reduced, and at the impact on the
termination decision where a reduced prospective recovery implies easier judicial
dismissal.
77. To understand this point, consider the following investment alternatives: an
investment having a 10% chance of yielding a return of $1,000,000 and a 90% chance of
a zero return; and an investment having a 100% chance of yielding a return of $100,000
(but no higher). To the risk neutral investor, both alternatives are equal because they
each have a discounted present value of $100,000. The risk preferrer would opt for the
first, whereas the risk-averse investor would prefer the second. If we assume that
directors are risk averse (an obvious assumption that need not be defended here),
they would prefer a world in which the possible financial liability was greatly reduced, even though its imposition was made correspondingly more likely, than a small
risk of astronomic liability - even if the two legal regimes had an equivalent deterrent value to the risk neutral individual.
78. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Marke supra note 3, at 785-86;
Council Draft No. 5, supra note 5, § 7.17.
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the ceiling times the number of defendants held liable. Whatever
the level of the ceiling, this amount will frequently be substantial
enough to exceed the expected litigation costs. Second, in most
"real world" instances at least one defendant will have allegedly
breached a duty of loyalty or would otherwise be ineligible for the
ceiling; this also increases the total expected benefit and prevents
automatic termination of all actions alleging due-care violations.
Third, as proposed, the ceiling would not apply to several categories of due-care violations: (i) a "knowing violation" of law; (ii)
reckless behavior in which there was a "conscious disregard or indifference to the defendant's duties to the corporation;" (iii) "a
sustained and unexcused pattern of inattention that amounted in
substance to an abdication of the defendant's duties to the corporation;" and (iv) transactions in which the defendant or an associate
received an "improper benefit. ' 79 One can, of course, debate the
phrasing of these exceptions, but I believe they essentially cover
the limited number of decisions, such as Francisv. United Jersey
Bank,80 in which courts have actually imposed substantial liability.
In this sense, the proposal is less revolutionary than it first appears and is essentially a "restatement" of the existing reality of
judicial behavior.
At the same time, a ceiling on due-care liability should have the
following desirable impacts. First, it should reduce the leverage
that the typically high damages involved in most serious errors of
business judgment would give a plaintiff if we were to enforce the
duty of due care as Professor Cox proposes. The perverse irony is
that it is precisely in those instances that we least need a litigation
remedy (i.e., situations involving arm's length business errors such
as manufacturing the Edsel, excessive bank lending to third world
countries, or mistaken decisions to start a new product line) that
the damages are typically the highest, and that the plaintiff would
thereby have the greatest leverage to compensate for the inherent
weakness of his case.8 1
79. Council Draft No. 5, supra note 5, § 7.17(a). This is only proposed language

that has never been approved or discussed by the Council of the American Law Institute. It is quoted here only to give a clear sense of the proposal criticized by Professor
Cox in his piece.
80. 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). Francisarose out of behavior far from ordinary negligence, as members of the defendant's family looted the bank by making
illegal loans. One may reasonably infer that the behavior of the defendant in Francis
(who was the mother of the individuals who looted the bank in addition to being the
remaining director) amounted to recklessness.
81. Absent a ceiling, the directors of a public corporation that has experienced a
major financial crisis might easily be alleged to have negligently made or tolerated
decisions that resulted in a $500 million loss. Assume that there is only a 5% chance
of obtaining a plaintiffs' verdict at trial (although in a jury trial this may be overly
conservative), on these facts, the product of the possible recovery times the
probability of such a recovery here is $25 million. This amount is well in excess of the
likely costs of the action. Because the formula announced in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 1051 (1983), instructs the court to determine whether the "likely recoverable damages discounted by the probability of a finding of liability are less than the costs to the corporation in continuing the action...",
id.at 892, the impact of such a formula is to require the continuation of this action,
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Second, the cost of liability insurance to directors and officers
(which is generally borne by the corporation) would be reduced
because exposure would be lessened. Although directors' and officers' insurance today mitigates the risk-aversion problem, it is
neither a perfect solution (because most insurance policies are surprisingly ambiguous) nor a costless one. Having shareholders bear
the cost of insurance that protects directors against paying damages to shareholders seems pointlessly circular. The simpler solution is either to reduce the liability exposure or to insure the
corporation directly against negligent acts of its agents.
Third, reduced damages also implies reduced attorneys' fees for
plaintiffs' attorney in due-care cases. Such a legal rule provides an
incentive to the plaintiffs' attorney to focus on duty-of-loyalty
cases.
Fourth, a ceiling protects corporate officials in circumstances in
which even an absolute right in the board to terminate derivative
litigation would fail to provide protection. For example, the
board's existence does not survive bankruptcy (when the trustee
in bankruptcy can and recently has instituted suit on due-care
grounds) 2 and the composition or loyalty of the board is no longer
where hostile takeovers have
certain in a corporate 8marketplace
3
become very common.
Finally, there is a less obvious impact of a ceiling on due-care
liability: it protects the law's traditional insistence that the disgorgement of unjust enrichment not be funded through insurance.8 4 Directors' and officers' insurance policies today typically
even though most would regard it as frivolous. Moreover, if the firm were in receivership, no board would exist that could reject demand and seek dismissal. See infra
note 82. In this light, the impact of a ceiling is far more significant and quite different
than the hasty assessment the ABA Committee suggests. See supra note 72.
82. See, e.g., Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct.
287 (1983). In Meyers, a substantial jury verdict on theories of both gross negligence
and ordinary negligence against a former chief executive officer of a bankrupt firm
was sustained on appeal by the Fifth Circuit. As I read Meyers, the defendant did not
appear to have received or sought any improper benefit from his firm, but simply
accepted high risks.
83. For example, in the aftermath of a recent control contest at GAF Corporation,
derivative actions were pending against the ousted former management. Attorneys
for the corporation have informed me that the incoming board has decided not to
oppose these derivative actions maintained by shareholders against the prior management, but will seek to take the actions over. Similarly, in the wake of the debacle at
Continental Illinois, the board has also decided not to oppose derivative actions commenced against former officials of that corporation. See Williams, Continental Cites
Lax Lending, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1984, at D1, col. 6 (Continental Illinois special litigation committee favors continuation of action against three middle echelon officers
and dismissal against others).
84. The common law of insurance has long precluded insurance of punitive damages, fines, penalties, and the gains from misconduct. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty
Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). Some state statutes expressly preclude
insurance of any liability that results from an adjudication that a corporate official
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exclude liability based on self-dealing or improper benefit. As a
result, the parties may find it in their mutual interest to
recharacterize a duty-of-loyalty claim as a duty-of-care claim in order to obtain access to insurance that can fund settlement. But
such recharacterization undercuts the deterrent threat necessary
to prevent improper self-dealing and thus gives rise to a "moral
hazard" problem. However, once a ceiling is placed on liability for
due care it becomes much less possible to convert a loyalty claim
into a due-care claim for purposes of funding the settlement because the liability would often exceed the low ceiling on the duty
of care. In this light, a ceiling guards the common law's traditional
refusal to permit insurance for self-dealing.
Still, the proposal for a ceiling will strike many as unorthodox
and therefore undesirable. After all, it may be argued, other professionals, including doctors and lawyers, face the threat of liability without the benefit of a ceiling. But the analogy between
directors and professionals is imperfect because it overlooks two
basic distinctions. First, doctors and other professionals are entrepreneurs who factor into their price a cost to cover this risk of
liability. At least with respect to directors, it is doubtful that
many have agreed to bear this risk; rather, they may see themselves more as part-time volunteers than as risk-taking entrepreneurs. Second, although the need for compensation is urgent for
the patient injured by malpractice, it is considerably weaker in the
case of the shareholder, who can, after all, diversify his portfolio.
Given that the argument for a ceiling is strong, where should
the level be set? Tentative Draft No. 1 used a $200,000 level, borrowing it from section 1708(c)(2) of the ALI's Federal Securities
Code, which basically used this level to limit liability for a nontrading defendant who was sued under the Code's equivalent to
Rule 10b-5.8 5 The original approach taken in Tentative DraftNo. 1
sought only to piggyback on a prior compromise in recognition
that the same conduct could be attacked often under either a duecare or a federal-securities-law theory of liability. For example, a
corporate official who prepares a misleading press release has in
effect committed a due-care violation. Presumably, his liability should be the same whether he is sued under the Federal
Securities Code or the state law duty of due care.
Concededly, a serious problem with the approach taken in
Tentative Draft No. 1 is that any fixed ceiling is necessarily arbitrary and lacks a conceptual foundation. Furthermore, over time
a fixed ceiling will be trivialized by the impact of inflation. The
current proposal in CouncilDraftNo. 5 therefore attempts a more
acted in a dishonest or fraudulent fashion. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727(b)
(McKinney 1983). The standard insurance policy goes even further to limit such coverage by including a broad "dishonesty" exception. See Hinsey, The New Lloyd's Policy FormforDirectorsand Officers Liability Insurance-An Analysis, 33 BUs. LAw.
1961, 1970 (1978).
85. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 4, § 7.06. See FED. SEC. CODE § 1708(c)(2)
(1980); see also supra note 66.
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6
flexible ceiling that also has a firmer conceptual underpinning.8
It proposes that the measure of damages for a due-care violation
should be determined not by a tort formula (i.e., all damages proximately caused by the breach) but by a contract formula.8 7 If one
looks to contract law, two analogies suggest themselves. First, the
law of restitution suggests that a negligent director would receive
unjust enrichment if he were allowed to retain the director's fee
that he was paid in order to exercise reasonable care. Section 373
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that a defaulting party can be required to restore any benefit received as a result of partial performance. 8 Here, by analogy, the director's fee
can be said to be a benefit received in a situation in which the
promised services were not adequately performed. On this theory,
the director's liability should be to return the benefit.
The law of restitution implies only that a director's compensation can be an element of damages, not that damages are limited to
this amount. The doctrinal basis for suggesting that damages
should be limited to this amount comes from section 351(3) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts which provides that a court
"may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for
loss of profits ... or otherwise, if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation."8' 9 The official comment to this section indicates that

the "fact that the [benefit received by the defendant] ...

is rela-

tively small suggests that it was not intended to cover the risk of
such liability." 90 Few would argue that annual directors' fees were
computed on the assumption that directors agreed to be insurers
86. See Council Draft No. 5, supra note 5, § 7.17. Professor Cox does not discuss
specifically Council Draft No. 5, which was not available to him at the time he wrote.
Again, this draft, like Council Draft No. 3, has not been approved by the Council of
the American Law Institute, and is only a proposal.
87. Others had argued earlier against a mechanical application of the traditional
tort rule of damages to the context of due-care liability. See Conard, A Behavioral
Analysis of Directors'Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE L J. 895, 913-15 (damages
should be limited by what a prudent director would risk).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 (1981). Section 373, "Restitution
When Other Party Is In Breach," provides that "the injured party is entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of part performance or reliance." Id
89. Id. § 351(3).
90. Id. at comment f ("Other Limitations on Damages"). For decisions supporting
this rule that the extreme disproportion of the damages in relation to the benefits of
the contract may be considered, see Lamkins v. International Harvester Co., 207 Ark.
637, 640, 182 S.W.2d 203, 205 (1944); Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 245 N.Y.
284, 287-92, 157 N.E. 140,141-43, cert. denied, 275 U.S. 557 (1927); Newsome v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 153 N.C. 153, 154, 69 S.E. 10, 11 (1910). Another factor cited in these
decisions is the absence of a formal contract in which the defendant assumed such
liability. This factor also favors the corporate official as defendant because I doubt
any director has executed such a contractual assumption of liability in favor of the
corporation he serves.
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for business losses. As a result, section 351(3) can be read to suggest that imposing the full measure of the losses upon directors
would result in "disproportionate compensation." 91 Accordingly,
the currently pending section 7.17 of CouncilDraftNo. 5 proposes
that a corporate official's liability for negligence be limited to his
"direct compensation received from the corporation during the
corporate fiscal year in which the violation principally occurred. '92 Losses equal to this amount would still have to be
proven by the plaintiff, however, because section 7.17 is only a
ceiling and not a penalty.
This formula, of course, imposes higher liability on inside directors and managers than on outside directors, but such a differential is also logically related to the probable difference in their level
of risk aversion and to the degree to which they occupy a truly
entrepreneurial position. The ceiling would also be subject to the
same exceptions as previously noted for knowing violation of law,
93
conscious recklessness, abdication of duty and improper benefit.
Doctrinally, the argument for using a contract measure of damages rests on the assertion that the corporation is, itself, a creature
of contract (to be sure, one to which the state is a necessary party).
Nothing in statutory law compels the conclusion that a legislature
ever choose a tort formula (especially in view of the paucity of
decisions that have ever sought to compute damages for a due-care
violation). But, the troubling issue is how this established tort
formula can be replaced by the more appropriate contract measure of damages, given that legislation is not likely to be soon
adopted in most states. My own view is that charter amendments
provide the most logical means of implementation. To be sure,
this avenue of reform is fraught with peril, for once Pandora's box
is opened, it may lead to attempts to adopt other less justifiable
limitations on damages, including those that purport to limit damages for duty-of-loyalty violations. Although a host of issues arise
here that the ALI's proposals do not at present address, I believe
that a sophisticated court would accept a self-imposed limitation
on liability for negligence so long as it did not purport to cover
reckless or knowingly illegal behavior. 94 Thus, the practical rele91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1981).
92. Council Draft No. 5, supra note 5, § 7.17(b). This phrase "direct compensation" would not include stock option appreciation (from options awarded in prior
years) or pension plan contributions. This formula would obviously vary the level of

damages in proportion to the director's or executive's status within the corporation.
93. See supra text accompanying note 79.
94. Case law has only infrequently considered the issues raised by a provision in
the corporation's certificate of incorporation that sought to reduce the potential liability of a fiduciary. Typically, the issues that have arisen involved the scope of the duty
owed by the fiduciary and not the extent of the damages obtainable for a breach. In
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952), the Court upheld a charter provision that specified that, in the absence of fraud, a transaction with
an interested director was not invalidated by the presence of interlocking directors,
and that further authorized the vote of the interested directors to be counted for purposes of a quorum. I& at 310, 93 A.2d at 117. Unsurprising as this specific result is, it
is highly relevant here that the court announced a relatively lenient standard for reVOL.
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vance of the ALI's proposals in this area may be that they offer a
desirable form of boilerplate - one that courts could accept and
shareholders could understand without close scrutiny.9 5 Other
charter limitations on due-care liability would be possible outside
view of charter provisions that deviated from traditional common law standards. Essentially, it viewed the enabling provisions of the Delaware corporate* law as
permitting any provision to be placed in a charter, except those that "achieve a result
forbidden by settled rules of public policy." Id. at 312, 93 A.2d at 118. Although it
wisely declined to address what the term "public policy" incorporated, it clearly indicated that the term was not coextensive with the common law[We say that the stockholders of a Delaware corporation may by contract
embody in the charter a provision departing from the rules of the common
law, provided that it does not transgress a statutory enactment or a public
policy settled by the common law or implicit in the General Corporation
Law itself.
Id. Is the standard tort measure of damages such a "public policy settled by the common law?" I think not for several reasons. First, the common law of trusts has historically permitted a trustee to contract to relieve himself of liability for negligence but
not for breaches of duty that were in bad faith, intentional, or recklessly indifferent to
the interests of the beneficiary. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959).
This line between negligence and recklessness is precisely that recognized by the ceiling proposed by section 7.17. In addition, the case law has repeatedly upheld indemnification agreements by which one party agrees to hold another harmless from the
consequences of the latter's own negligence, despite the evident "moral hazard" problem that arises in this context. See Simon v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 391 F. Supp. 708,
709 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205, 211-13, 269 N.E.2d 794,
801-03, 321 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85-87 (1971); Dillon v. Riverso Constr. Co., 39 A.D.2d 744, 745,
332 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), affd, 33 N.Y.2d 530, 301 N.E.2d 422, 347
N.Y.S.2d 434 (1973). According to the New York Court of Appeals, such contracts will
be strictly construed, but they are valid unless there is evidence of "fraud or overreaching conduct." Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d at 213, 269 N.E.2d at 803, 321
N.Y.S.2d at 87. One recent federal case has even enforced such an agreement absolving one party of liability for negligence in a case explicitly involving a claimed breach
of fiduciary duty. See Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., [1984 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,819, at 90,117 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (where bank had absolved
itself of liability for negligence by contract with its limited partners, plaintiff could
not maintain an action for "conduct less than gross negligence or willful misconduct."
I&i at 90,119. Thus, the common law seems to permit contractual exculpation, except
in cases involving self-dealing, fraud or egregious incompetence (whether described as
"gross negligence" in Quintel or "recklessness" in the Restatement of Trusts), and in
these cases the ceiling in section 7.17 would not apply in any event.
95. This has been the valuable use to which the American Bar Foundation's Commentaries on Indentures (1971) has been put, and the same arguments apply to any
exculpatory provision limiting liability for negligence. As the fifth circuit noted in
Broad v. Rockwell Int' Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
(1981):
A large degree of uniformity in the language of debenture indentures is
essential to the effective functionion of the financial markets: uniformity... is what makes it possible meaningfully to compare one debenture
issue with another, focusing only on the business provisions of the issue
...without being misled by peculiarities in the underlying instruments.
See also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d
Cir. 1982), cent denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983) ("[ulniformity in interpretation is important to the efficiency of the capital markets"). Put simply, we economize on the monitoring costs that both courts and shareholders would incur (and we reduce the
uncertainty for defendants as to the validity of such provisions) if an acceptable boilerplate provision limiting directorial liability could be commonly accepted and given a
uniform interpretation by courts.
1 QR4"

of the safe harbor that section 7.17 would offer, but these individually tailored provisions should receive closer judicial scrutiny because there is little basis for believing that shareholders could
effectively monitor them. In particular, little confidence should
be placed on limitations adopted in the original certificate of incorporation to the extent that they immunized corporate officials
from any liability to shareholders for due-care violations. At this
point, traditional contract principles, such as those applicable to
contracts of adhesion, would become relevant, and a sophisticated
court could use them to reach a just result under the circumstances. These issues, however, present a topic for another day.
Conclusion
My response to Professors Scott and Cox may sound as if we share
little common ground. In fact, as I read them, we largely agree on
the major issue that today is in dispute in most courts concerning
derivative litigation: whether a derivative action should be dismissed on the board's recommendation without substantive review by the court. Professor Cox has explicitly rejected the
demand-required, demand-excused test, which, after the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Aronson, threatens to undercut the basic logic of its earlier decision in Zapata. 96 Professors
Scott and Brudney clearly also concur on this point. Indeed, in all
the recent outpouring of articles on derivative litigation, I have yet
to find a serious academic effort to justify this formalistic distinction.9 7 Thus, rather than conclude on a note of discord, I think it
best to end by stressing the consensus that appears to exist within
the academic legal community. Among both those writing in the
"law and economics" mode of discourse and those whose orientation is toward the traditional law of fiduciary duties there is a
common recognition of the need for an effective litigation remedy
as part of an overall system of corporate accountability. The dispute among us is limited to the subsidiary question of what duties
should be so enforced and to what extent. At one end of the continuum, some would limit the operation of a litigation remedy to
the protection of the market for corporate control, 98 whereas at
96. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). In Aronson, the court held
that the justification for dismissal advanced by a duly qualified special litigation committee could only be reviewed by the court in those circumstances where demand on
the board was excused on grounds of its futility. Id at 818. Because the defendant
owned 47% of the corporation's stock and allegedly controlled the board, this holding
may trivialize the original result in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.
1981). Prior to Aronson, some federal courts had declined to read Zapata as placing
dispositive emphasis on the demand required, demand excused distinction. See In re
Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 572 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. ll. 1983); Mills v.
Esmark, 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1282-84 (N.D. Ill. 1982). For a subsequent refinement of
Aronson's formula, see Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
97. There are, of course, those who largely reject the need for a litigation remedy,
preferring to rely on market-based remedies. See Fischel, supra note 11, at 1272,1292.
But the weight placed by Aronson on the formality of the demand required, demand
excused distinction has, to my knowledge, no serious academic support.
98. Even Professor Fischel, as I read him, would accept the need for a litigation
VOL.
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the other end, some, including Professor Cox, would use it to enforce the duty of care. Although I tend to agree with those who
believe that a distinction should be drawn between the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty in terms of the reliance placed on litigation as a remedy, but the larger point is that virtually all concur
on the desirability of a litigation remedy for some contexts.
This consensus stands in sharp opposition to those who continue
to becloud the issue of proper scope of a litigation remedy with a
smokescreen of diversionary topics such as vivid, if apocryphal,
stories about "strike suit" attorneys, vague references to the
Japanese success without litigation, or paeans to the superior wisdom of independent directors. Those who so argue always glide
over the distinction between loyalty and care, and present all litigation as an attempt to second guess the business decisions of disinterested directors. 99 In fact, except for a brief spurt of litigation
over "illegal payments" in the 1970s, due-care litigation has been
only a small tail on a much larger dog. The real world of derivative litigation (to the extent that it survives) typically involves
takeover defense tactics, greenmail, golden parachutes, and intracorporate transactions between parent corporations and partially
owned subsidiaries. Here, a monitoring mechanism is needed, because these are anything but ordinary business transactions, and
they are frequently beyond the effective reach of market-based
remedies.
The basic reality of the litigation remedy then is sufficiently
simple as to be almost academically uninteresting. Once a derivative action is consigned to the tender mercies of a special litigation
committee, its fate is predictable: almost invariably, the independent directors vote to terminate it.lo ° Thus, the central issue not

debated here between Professor Cox and myself, but central to
remedy to remove impediments to the free operation of the market for corporate control. See Fischel, supra note 11, at 1290-91. The derivative action is the most logical,
although not the exclusive, route to this end.
99. See Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Suits Against Directorson
Business Judgment Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAW. 1503 (1984).
100. Professor Cox has undertaken the valuable task of cataloguing the results
reached by special litigation committee reports. In his last study, he found only one
instance in which the committee had not recommended termination against all defendants. See Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice, supra note 3, at 963
rm.13-14. In the lone case he cites, Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983), termination was recommended against a majority of the
defendants, but the Second Circuit reversed this result. Since then, the Continental
Illinois committee recommended continuing the action against certain defendants
(none of them senior officials). See supra note 83. However, the trial court in this
case also rejected the recommendation. See In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 572 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Most recently, Chase Manhattan Bank has,
itself, commenced suit against six former officers, including two former executive vice
presidents, for losses incurred by those in connection with the Penn Square Bank
failure. Chase alleges, however, that the conduct of the former officers knowingly
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the ALI's Corporate Governance Project and illustrative of the
need for that Project, is the relevance of the experience of special
litigation committees. In fashioning legal rules, should we take
note of this experience or ignore it and begin instead by deducing
our answer from the traditional premise that the business and affairs of the corporation are to be managed by its board of directors? Sound as the business judgment rule basically is, reliance on
it here is misplaced once we recognize that the duty of loyalty has
always been exempt from the business judgment rule. 10 1 Even
more important than the doctrinal error in attempting to expand
the business judgment rule into this area is the fallacious methodology involved in this approach. Unless we are to reject all that
we have learned from the Legal Realists, an approach that simply
seeks to derive conclusions deductively from first principles is
misguided. The standards of the ALI's Project in this area instead
proceed from an inductive starting point: that the life of the law
has not been logic but experience. All experience with the special
litigation committee strongly suggests that there is need for close
judicial oversight of its performance. On this less than revolutionary premise, Part VII of Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations will either stand or fall.

violated explicit internal credit policies that the bank had long established. See
Glaberson, supra note 40. In this light, the Chase action is not a negligence based
action.
101. As Professor Buxbaum has cogently argued, state law has generally permitted
a court to review the substantive fairness of a self-dealing transaction (to varying degrees) and has given very little weight to a retrospective ratification of such a transaction by even disinterested directors. The decision to terminate is the functional
equivalent of a retrospective ratification and should not therefore receive substantially dissimilar treatment. See Buxbaum, Conflict of Interest Statutes and the Need
for Demand on Directors in Derivative Actions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1122, 1125-27
(1980). This argument is seldom, if ever, addressed by the proponents of the Aronson
rule.
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